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I. Introduction
Since its formation in 1960 from the union of British Somaliland and 
Italian Somaliland, the Somali Republic was always dependent on for-
eign aid to balance its operations and development budgets. In each of 
the three years after independence, the Republic financed 31 percent 
of its budget with grants from its former colonizers: Britain and Italy.1 
General Mohamed Siad Barre’s socialist military regime of 1969–1991 
heavily depended on financial and technical support from the U.S.S.R. 
until disagreement about the 1977–78 war between Somalia and Ethio-
pia disrupted the relationship. Due to Somalia’s strategic location and 
the Cold War, Siad Barre was able to replace the financial loss caused 
by the departure of the U.S.S.R. with aid from the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, and countries in Western Europe.
The 1977–78 war and its aftermath caused the displacement of a 
large number of Somali-Ethiopians who sought refuge in Somalia. Siad 
Barre’s regime received massive humanitarian support to resettle the 
displaced people in refugee camps in Somalia. However, most of the 
food was diverted to supplement the income of Somali soldiers or was 
used to fuel the Western Somali Liberation Front’s war against Ethio-
pia.2 Siad Barre also received financial and military support from the 
U.S. and other countries in the West to repel armed and largely clan-
based movements against his regime. By 1990, just before it fell, Siad 
Barre’s government was getting annual financial support of $100 mil-
lion (second only to Egypt and Israel) from the U.S.3
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When the regime fell in 1991, the clan-based rebel groups took con-
trol of the majority of the regions in the country and civil conflict 
erupted. Bi-lateral aid dried up, but humanitarian aid still contin-
ued, albeit in an inconsistent and uncoordinated manner. The United 
Nations and the U.S. both intervened in Somalia in 1992, presumably 
to facilitate the delivery of food to starving Somalis. Due to significant 
casualties, however, both withdrew by 1995. Since then, the interna-
tional community has only haphazardly and without coordinated or 
well-thought-out plans intervened in Somalia.4
Lately, the U.S. and European Union countries have taken a more 
active role, fearing that Somalia has become a safe haven for terrorists. 
The U.S. also links the current powerful group al-Shabaab to al-Qaeda.5 
A Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was set up in 2004, and since 
then has been struggling to keep any sort of power, even over most 
of Mogadishu. It controls parts of the capital, with al-Shabaab largely 
controlling Southern Somalia. Conditions are not improving due to 
insecurity, the difficulty of humanitarian aid reaching those in need, 
and/or mismanagement and serious corruption.6 Still, United Nations 
agencies and national humanitarian actors report annual humanitarian 
and development budgets for Somalia.
This article discusses the nature of foreign aid to Somalia and the 
efficacy and transparency issues that surround it. Emphasis is placed 
on the aid that currently enters the country. The essay concludes that 
foreign aid has not achieved its stated objectives and suggests that an 
aid paradigm shift is necessary. It argues that a program that includes 
the development of the rule of law, property rights, and legal empower-
ment of the poor would yield better results than traditional approaches 
to aid provision for development. If supplemented with foreign and 
domestic policies conducive to trade, these measures could improve 
the tax base of any reconstructive government.
II. Rationale and Sources of Current Foreign Aid to Somalia
In 2011, for the fourth year, Somalia is judged as the most acutely failed 
state in the world.7 A failed state is a country characterized by poverty, 
insecurity, and a disregard for human rights. In introducing this year’s 
current ranking, Foreign Policy wrote, “Somalia’s unending woes are the 
stuff hopelessness is made of.” The purchasing power parity adjusted 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Somalia is $5.4 billion, or a per cap-
ita income of $600, given its population of nine million.8 Somalia ranks 
at the bottom of the community of nations regardless of which index is 
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used. Only 39 percent of the population can read and write;9 life expec-
tancy is merely 50 years;10 and the infant mortality rate is 110 per 1,000 
births.11 Furthermore, only 29 percent of the population has access to 
clean drinking water and only 30 percent of children are enrolled in 
primary schools.12
In both 2009 and 2010, more than 3.2 million people of the nation’s 
nine million people required humanitarian aid.13 Since 1991, when the 
government of Siad Barre fell, more than 360,000 people have been 
killed, many by violence-created famine.14 The misery continues into 
the present. In June 2010 alone, intensified fighting between the TFG 
and its supporters (including 8,000 AMISON soldiers) on one side and 
al-Shabaab and its supporters on the other killed more than 100 people 
and displaced more than 270,000, causing the number of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) to reach 1.5 million.15 Given these statistics, it 
is difficult to quarrel with the need for both humanitarian and devel-
opment aid to Somalia. As a result, for the last decade, the annual aid, 
including humanitarian, that was supposed to reach Somalia was in 
the hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars. Yet the main questions are: 
Was the aid effective and was it transparent?
Foreign aid to Somalia from major sources, such as the UNDP, UNI-
CEF, USAID, and WFP, amounted to more than $1 billion in 2009 and 
over $800 million in 2010, as shown in Table 1.
The stated objectives of UNDP for such aid include reducing pov-
erty and civil wars and improving peace and security. UNICEF-Soma-
lia focuses on communication for development; youth as agents of 
change; protecting children from violence, abuse, exploitation, and 
discrimination; and HIV/AIDS awareness, prevention, and control. 
In 2010, UNICEF had 210 staff working with Somalia, 50 in Nairobi 
and the rest in Somalia. But UNICEF-Somalia is physically located in 
Nairobi, Kenya. USAID Somalia focuses on fostering conditions for 
sustainable peace, improving delivery of social services, and meeting 
humanitarian needs. The World Food Programme (WFP) has similar 
objectives to USAID.
Table 1. Aid to Somalia in 2009 and 2010
Source 2009 2010 Reference
UNDP  $ 48,767,208   $49,534,540 (UNDP, n.d.)  
UNICEF Somalia $ 79,000,000   Not yet available (UNICEF, n.d.)
USAID Somalia $411,186,000 $133,820,000 (only preliminary) (USAID, n.d)
WFP $482,529,259 $651,000,000 (Budget) (WFP, n.d)
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UNDP works with other U.N. agencies in Somalia to carry out three 
main programs: Governance, Rule of Law and Society, and Recovery 
and Sustainable Livelihoods.16 UNDP states that it uses its budget for 
Somalia to build governance programs that help central governments 
perform essential functions, such as rebuilding infrastructure, financial 
management, and budget development. It also carries on programs 
to strengthen law and justice to deal with violence and community 
safety, as well as education programs that foster gender equality and 
improve maternal health. Both UNICEF and UNDP indicate that they 
help reduce poverty and hunger. They try to improve water and sani-
tation as well.17 However, since these organizations are based in Nai-
robi, Kenya, there is no guarantee that the amounts allocated to these 
programs reach their destinations.
The organizations themselves are documenting the difficulties they 
face in delivering the aid. The biggest problem is the security of their 
humanitarian aid workers. Aid agencies complain of bandits and mili-
tias that target aid workers, loot aid, and carjack vehicles. In early 2010, 
WFP had to suspend aid to parts of the southern regions of Somalia 
due to insecurity and demands from armed groups.18 In 2010, 625,000 
persons in al-Shabaab-held areas required aid. Aid agencies say that, 
in general, these al-Shabaab-controlled regions are some of the most 
dangerous places for humanitarian workers.19
Another obstacle to providing aid is the recent increase in piracy. 
Some countries, the U.S. in particular, are hesitant to provide aid due 
to recent links between al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda.20 The U.S. is con-
cerned that aid is being diverted to al-Shabaab. Yet even if aid was able 
to reach its destination, there is no unanimity that it is good for Soma-
lia (or for that matter any other recipient country).
III. Efficacy of Foreign Aid to Somalia
Foreign aid is supposed to transfer resources and know-how from 
richer countries in order to accelerate social and economic develop-
ment in poorer countries like Somalia. Unfortunately, foreign aid to 
Somalia has not produced the expected results. The reasons range 
from lack of congruency between the objectives of the donors and 
those of successive Somali governments to a disabling incompetence 
of those carrying out the projects. In general, the successive govern-
ments of Somalia instituted economic policies that could not respond 
to economic shocks and crises, and as a result could not foster eco-
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nomic growth.21 Somalia’s economic history is replete with misdirected 
and ineffective economic strategic initiatives by the colonial, post-inde-
pendence, socialist, and IMF-led regimes.22 In addition to the mis-
match between the market and the incentives set by the governments 
of General Mohamed Siad Barre from 1969–1991, the failure was com-
pounded by conditional loans by the West and the IMF.23 Most of the 
time, aid funds were spent on products or services in donor countries 
rather than making the purchases locally in Somalia for much less cost. 
Therefore, Somalis have not seen the creation of wealth and develop-
ment that were expected to follow the provision of foreign aid.
A case in point is that Somalia was self-sufficient in food produc-
tion before the late 1970s when food aid started in earnest after a flood 
of refugees arrived from Ethiopia in the aftermath of the 1977–78 war 
between Somalia and Ethiopia.24 By 1984, 63 percent of the food con-
sumed in Somalia was imported, a complete reversal of the situation at 
independence in 1960 and during the first decade after independence.25 
As a result of the massive food aid that arrived with the refugees, grain 
prices fell dramatically to such a level that local farmers could not 
cover their costs, thus reducing incentives for domestic production.26
Perhaps the most devastating consequences of food aid to Somalia 
were the corruption, mismanagement, and lack of accountability and 
transparency that it fostered.27 Michael Maren, who went to Somalia 
as a food monitor for USAID in 1981, was taken aback by the level of 
corruption in food aid distribution. As documented in his book Road to 
Hell, he found that two-thirds of the aid was stolen by the military right 
from the docks in Mogadishu or from the refugee camps. The reported 
number of refugees was also inflated in order to receive more aid. But 
he also found that relief organizations were not concerned at all about 
whether the food was going to the victims because their primary goal 
was to remain financially solvent.
Look forward almost four decades and the military government of 
Somalia is no more, but both food aid and non-food aid have acceler-
ated, and the problems still remain. In addition, the use of food and 
non-food aid by donors for strategic interest continues. The U.S. is one 
of the major donors of aid to Somalia, but it seems that the aid is now 
guided more by the strategic concerns to reduce piracy and terror-
ism rather than development or humanitarian objectives.28 As Table 
2 shows, in 2008, humanitarian assistance accounted for 95 percent 
of total aid by USAID, while peace and security comprised only 1.2 
percent. In 2009, peace and security accounted for 64 percent, while 
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humanitarian assistance accounted for 32 percent. The statistics for 
2010 were not complete at the time of this writing (June 2011). How-
ever, out of $133 million budgeted by USAID for Somalia in fiscal year 
2010, $113 million, or 85%, is allocated for peace and security. In fiscal 
year 2011, the data is still spotty, but the comparable figure is 77 per-
cent allocated for peace and security. Development seems to have been 
quite ignored. Humanitarian assistance is also waning, and not as a 
result of improvement in the food situation.
Since the Transitional Federal Government, supported by the U.S., 
is trying to repel attacks from al-Shabaab, which is considered by the 
U.S. to be a terrorist group, one may understand the strategic shift in 
aid to Somalia. But Somalis seem to be disappointed with the pervasive 
ineptitude of the current Somali government. Learned and informed 
Somalis with whom I have discussed this situation are by-and-large in 
agreement that humanitarian and development aid should not be sac-
rificed for security support to the TFG, which seems to have neither the 
will nor the means to fight al-Shabaab. These Somalis would like to see 
Table 2. USAID: Fiscal Years 2008–11, by Objective, in Millions of Dollars
  FY 2008  FY 2009  FY 2010  FY 2011 
  Total Total  Estimate  Request 
TOTAL  262.832  411.186  133.820  84.958
1 Peace and Security  3.035  262.658  113.000  65.590
 1.1 Counter-Terrorism  — 2.000  — —
 1.3 Stabilization Operations and Security 
  Sector Reform  3.035  247.600  104.000  57.590
 1.6 Conflict Mitigation and Reconciliation  — 13.058  9.000  8.000
2 Governing Justly and Democratically  1.914  8.687  11.270  8.550
 2.1 Rule of Law and Human Rights  — — 0.500  —
 2.2 Good Governance  1.514  3.977  5.220  4.000
 2.3 Political Competition and 
  Consensus-Building  0.400  3.710  4.550  3.550 
 2.4 Civil Society  — 1.000  1.000  1.000 
3 Investing in People  9.253  9.055  6.550  6.550 
 3.1 Health  2.748  2.550  1.550  1.550 
  3.1.6 Maternal and Child Health  0.248  1.550  1.550  1.550 
  3.1.8 Water Supply and Sanitation  2.500  1.000  — —
 3.2 Education  6.505  6.505  5.000  5.000 
  3.2.1 Basic Education  6.505  6.505  5.000  5.000
4 Economic Growth  — — 3.000  4.268
 4.6 Private Sector Competitiveness  — — 3.000  4.268
5 Humanitarian Assistance  248.630  130.786  TBD  TBD
 5.1 Protection, Assistance and Solutions  248.630  130.786  TBD  TBD
USAID Website 
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a large portion of the development aid going to more stable parts of 
Somalia like Somaliland and Puntland, while providing more humani-
tarian aid to the southern parts of Somalia.
Other critics of the U.S. and U.N. aid to Somalia base their conclu-
sions on the aid’s general effect on Africa29 and the failure of the $50 bil-
lion per year that currently goes to Africa to help improve the standard 
of living. George Ayittey believes that the U.S. and U.N. initiatives 
are unlikely to help because they are not African solutions. Dambisa 
Moyo argues that in the past sixty years, more than one trillion dol-
lars have been transferred to Africa, but the lives of those living there 
have not improved. In fact, poverty levels have gone up and growth 
rates have gone down. Countries are trapped in a cycle of dependency, 
corruption, market distortion, and further poverty.30 Matthew Jallow 
contends that foreign aid mostly benefits the ruling elites and enables 
corrupt governments. The majority of the funding does not reach the 
intended groups. Jallow cites a study in Uganda, which found that of 
money designated for schools, only 30 percent reached them. Jallow 
also uses the World Bank finding in Somalia in 1998 that concluded 
that aid undermined civil society because people became dependent 
on foreign food, which depressed local prices and reduced the incen-
tive to grow food. These critics also argue that foreign aid is dictated 
by strategic and political goals. Other critics recommend cutting off 
humanitarian aid to Somalia and fighting terror.31 Chris Harnisch 
argues that humanitarian aid only strengthens terrorist groups that 
oppress the people.
IV. Can the Situation be Rectified?
Most of the foreign aid that Somalia currently receives is in the form of 
humanitarian aid. In 2010, aid agencies asked for $669 million to help 
feed and shelter 3.2 million Somalis who depended on them. However, 
some of the supporters of aid to Somalia are bothered by the fact that 
these foreign aid agencies are now located in Nairobi. This not only 
increases overhead costs, thus reducing the amount that ultimately 
reaches Somalia, but it also inhibits the transparency of the delivery 
system.
A. Should Aid Agencies be Moved to Somalia?
Aid agencies contend that locating in Nairobi was never their first 
choice. They are in Nairobi for the safety of their international workers. 
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In early 2010, the World Food Programme had to suspend operations 
in Southern Somalia due to insecurity in the region.32 Al-Shabaab also 
banned the World Food Programme after receiving complaints from 
local farmers about the impact of food aid on their ability to earn a live-
lihood.33 A recent conference on Somalia in Istanbul, Turkey, concluded 
that the environment in Somalia is very volatile and unpredictable and 
there is a shortage of humanitarian funding.34
In a typical year, there are about 1,500 aid workers for Somalia with 
over half located in Nairobi.35 Somalis deliver the majority of the aid 
because the situation is deemed too dangerous for international work-
ers. Local and international staff are targets of killings and kidnap-
pings. Unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan, where private security is used, 
aid budgets for Somalia are not large enough to incorporate foreign 
private security protection so any protection is provided by the local 
area.36
The Somali government has been asking aid agencies to relocate 
back to Mogadishu from Nairobi since 2010.37 Somalia’s Humanitarian 
Affairs Minister at the time, Mohammad Abdi Ibrahim, asked agencies 
to relocate, arguing that they would be better able to provide help from 
where it is needed, which is Mogadishu. Analysts believe that the relo-
cation alone would raise hope and increase the employment of Soma-
lis, thus improving economic activity and decreasing the response time 
to emergencies.38 The pressure to move to Mogadishu also came from 
the former U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Soma-
lia, Ambassador Amadou Ould-Abdallah, in early 2010. He argued 
that Somalia is not a hopeless case and peace should be relatively 
easy to achieve.39 He reasoned that to achieve peace, democratic and 
humanitarian efforts must move inside Mogadishu and provide the 
TFG with tangible assistance.
Michael Michalski from Doctors Without Borders, who worked in 
the Galgaduud region of Somalia (an area that has been off limits to 
the U.N. for years), wrote in 2007 that he has seen first-hand the ben-
efits of providing aid from within Somalia and believes that it needs 
to be done by all agencies.40 In many ways the situation of Somalia in 
2007 was even more dangerous than it is now. Michalski asserted that 
humanitarian aid administered from afar breeds a lack of accountabil-
ity, which causes the community to be suspicious.
It seems that all those who opine on whether aid agencies should 
move inside Somalia agree in principle on the desirability of donor 
agencies setting up shop in Mogadishu. The disagreement is on 
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whether any authority operating in Somalia—including the TFG, the 
U.N., and local administrations—can guarantee a normal level of secu-
rity. Even if the security situation improves, it would be difficult to 
convince the employees and heads of those aid agencies to abandon 
the fairly comfortable life that they have in Nairobi. Furthermore, the 
TFG does not have much bargaining power to demand such a move. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the agencies will move unless a credible 
Somali government is set up in Mogadishu. But even if the aid agen-
cies can be convinced to relocate to Mogadishu, that does not eliminate 
the corruption and lack of transparency of which both aid officials and 
Somali officials have been accused.
B. Should Funds Go Directly to the TFG?
There are arguments that aid funds should go to the Somali Tran-
sitional Government directly. Wafula Wamunyinyi, the deputy spe-
cial representative for the African Union Commission for Somalia, 
argued in April 2010 that the government of Somalia did not receive 
enough funding to achieve its objectives. He contended that the TFG 
has restored sufficient state institutions and accountability, and that 
its administration can now handle more funds directly.41 Others also 
believe that more accountability can be found through programs such 
as the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) contract that the government 
entered into in 2009.
The contract stipulates that PwC checks ministers’ spending plans 
before they are given the money and follows up to ensure it is spent 
transparently.42 PwC planned that a staff of about twenty will be 
located in Nairobi and operate in and out of Somalia. Will this contract 
prevent money from going into the pockets of corrupt officials and 
promote more direct funding to Somalia?
The funds that PwC contracted to track include millions pledged for 
health care, education, and security.43 PwC promised that it would set 
up a money tracking system so that the government would be able to 
take control of its own financial institutions in the long run. However, 
PwC did not explain how they were going to accomplish this goal. 
PwC Kenya has over 250 employees in the Nairobi and Mombasa 
offices.44 The contract stipulated that, while PwC Kenya staff would 
go to Mogadishu occasionally, the only people permanently located in 
Mogadishu would be local agents that deliver small cash payments and 
record them in electronic ledgers.45 To make sure that money is being 
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transferred properly, the local staff must obtain receipts and signatures 
from the people involved. This would then form the basis for reports 
that would go to donors every fifteen days.46 This was designed to 
reassure donors who pledged money for TFG operations but who were 
slow to release it due to the perception of corruption.47 For its trouble, 
PwC would receive a commission of 2–4 percent of all funds that reach 
the intended destination.
PwC is the largest accounting firm in the world, with yearly aver-
age revenue of over $20 billion. It operates in 148 countries and has 
the most experience in international financial affairs among the Big 
Four accounting firms (the others being Deloitte, Ernst & Young, and 
KPMG). PwC gained additional experience when it was hired to help 
the U.N. track aid for the tsunami victims.48
The PwC Kenya office won the Financial Consultancy of the Year 
Award in 2008, conferred by the African Investor Investment Awards. 
PwC International was selected as the 10th most admired knowledge 
enterprise in the world, ahead of other accounting firms.49 However, 
PwC also endured its share of scandals around the world. PwC was 
involved in the well-publicized Tyco Scandal, in which former Tyco 
chief executive L. Dennis Kozlowski and former chief financial officer 
Mark H. Swartz were found to have defrauded investors of $600 mil-
lion and were sentenced to prison terms of 8 to 25 years. In an out-of-
court settlement in July 2007, PwC agreed to pay $225 million to Tyco 
investors for its failure to catch the fraud.50 Shareholders stated that, as 
the independent auditor, PwC should have detected the fraud, because 
Tyco overstated its income by 5.8 billion from 1999 to 2002.
PwC was also involved in the ChuoAoyama scandal.51 ChuoAoyama 
PwC, one of Japan’s largest accounting firms, was ordered in 2006 to 
stop providing audits to its largest clients for two months (from July 
to August 2006). The firm certified false earnings for cosmetics giant 
Kanebo, which falsified financial statements for several years. PwC was 
also implicated in the PwC Satyam audit scandal in India.52 Known as 
India’s Enron, investors demanded to know how PwC missed the one 
billion dollar fraud at Satyam, an IT outsourcing company. A reported 
one billion dollar cash pile was only 78 million and the auditors should 
have detected it if they had run a check on the group’s bank accounts.
The upshot of this discussion is that the hiring of an international 
accounting firm may contribute to the overall credibility of the gov-
ernment’s financial reports but it cannot rule out fraud and corruption. 
By definition, international accounting rules, promulgated mostly for 
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profit-making entities, are not designed to replace internal homegrown 
control systems. And it certainly cannot replace the role of leaders to 
set an ethical tone. There is a close connection between corruption and 
the ethical mettle set by leaders of government. If the higher echelons 
of the TFG and regional administrations demonstrated competency, 
ethics, and integrity, then other leaders and their staffs would be more 
likely to uphold those values. In Somalia, the efforts expended by top 
leaders just to survive and keep their jobs has outweighed all other 
efforts, including setting standards for ethical behaviour.
V. Paradigm Shift in Development Aid
A. Emphasis on the Rule of Law
It would be cruel, at this junction in the history of the Somali people, 
for anyone to recommend cutting off the humanitarian support that 
3.2 million Somalis (36% of the population) depend on for their liveli-
hood. It would also not be practical to suggest that the money spent on 
peace and security be eliminated in this era of piracy and al-Shabaab. 
Yet, it must be acknowledged that aid, as it has been administered so 
far, has failed to reduce poverty or cause a growth in wealth. It has 
been argued that part of the failure was due to a constant change of 
priorities.53 For example, in the 1960s, aid was supposed to help indus-
trialization; in the 1970s, it had a poverty agenda; in the 1980s, it was to 
help in stabilization and liberalization of the economy; in the 1990s, aid 
was supposed to help governance; and the 2000s saw what Dambisa 
Moyo calls “rise of glamour” aid.54 In this article, however, I suggest 
another paradigm change. This time, I proffer that aid to countries 
like Somalia should have a legal empowerment objective. In order to 
reduce poverty, the poor must be legally empowered.
My suggestions follow the recommendations of the Commission on 
Legal Empowerment of the Poor that was set up in 2005 by the United 
Nations. The commission was co-chaired by Madeleine K. Albright, 
former U.S. Secretary of State, and Hernando De Soto, President of the 
Institute for Liberty and Democracy, headquartered in Lima, Peru. It 
included such notable members as Lloyd Axworthy, former Minister 
of Foreign Affairs for Canada; Benjamin Mkapa, former President of 
the United Republic of Tanzania; Mary Robinson, former President of 
Ireland and former High Commissioner for Human Rights; Lawrence 
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Summers, former U.S. Secretary of Treasury; and Ernesto Zedillo, for-
mer President of Mexico. It released its recommendations in 2008.55
The United Nations, through the Millennium Declaration of 2000 
and the associated Millennium Development Goals (MDG), has 
agreed to cut extreme poverty in half worldwide by the year 2015. Not 
addressed explicitly in the MDG is that the vast majority of the world’s 
poor, like Somalis, live their daily lives in what is often referred to as 
the informal or extralegal sector that is often excluded from the benefits 
of a legal order. Poor women and men generally lack effective legal 
protection or recognition of their economic assets and transactions.56 
The poor in Somalia live in an environment characterized by insecurity 
and constrained opportunities for participating in and benefiting from 
economic development. Any government installed in Somalia right 
now will face lower growth, less revenues, and less room for invest-
ing in health, education, and infrastructure, as well as perhaps more 
instability and armed conflict. In line with the legal empowerment 
commission’s recommendations, it is argued that a central question in 
poverty reduction should be how best to unlock the potential of local 
assets, entrepreneurship, and institution building. One of the main 
impediments to development in Somalia, as in other developing coun-
tries, and a main source of poverty is a lack of capital.
Somali’s poor possess far more capital than anybody has ever under-
stood, but that capital is “dead” in the sense that it does not produce 
additional capital. There are very few legally enforceable economic 
transactions based on property rights because there are no addresses 
attached to these assets. Somalia’s economy is almost exclusively extra-
legal. In the few parts of Somalia where law exists to some extent, the 
citizens do not trust the law or the government that enforces it. The 
extra-legal capital in Somalia is estimated to be about 200 percent of 
GDP, or $12 billion. Like the situation in other developing countries, 
extra-legality has always been the norm in Somalia and has accelerated 
since the collapse of the formal system in 1991.57
Many Somali citizens are entrepreneurs who do not think that they 
can benefit from the law due to entry and operational costs. The best 
remedy is to reform the law and bring in a more “citizen-friendly” 
law.58 These laws should be crafted with the help of the citizens; the 
common people can identify what the problems are. Official law 
should be aligned with how people actually live and work. Concerns 
are primarily about how to gain legal access to property (real estate or 
business) and how to leverage it. If government does not protect the 
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common people’s property, it surrenders the function to “vigilantes” 
and clan militias who seek the community’s allegiance. More impor-
tantly, as Hernando De Soto puts it, “Without a legal property system, 
efforts to create a sustainable market economy are doomed to fail.”59 A 
property rights system should be a component of any well-integrated 
legal empowerment project.
For a legal empowerment project to work, the committee put forth 
three main concepts. First, certain general conditions must be created. 
The identity of the person as a citizen, as an asset holder, and as a 
worker or a businessperson must be documented. The citizen must 
also be given a voice through information and education as well as 
through organizations and representation. Second, pillars of legal 
empowerment must be set up. A system of rule to which all citizens 
have access should be built. The principles enshrined in the law should 
include property rights, labor rights, and business rights. Third, there 
should be systemic change that leads to legal empowerment. For any 
system, change leading to legal empowerment must be focused on 
access to justice, assets, decent work, and markets. It must also be able 
to provide protection and opportunity.
As the committee also suggested, legal empowerment may in fact 
be smart politics and good economics. The decay and ultimate collapse 
of Somalia’s governance system led to politics gravitating to informal 
channels. Giving identity, voice, and representation to the poor may 
lead to justice for all, while property rights may lead to functioning 
markets, which may increase the productivity of assets.
Reviving the Somali economy requires building effective institu-
tions. Property rights make transactions easier and cheaper. They also 
make contracts enforceable. This may lead to the appearance of finan-
cial institutions like credit and insurance entities. Momentum should 
come from citizens and grassroots organizations. In the end, reforms 
should be based on local needs and conditions. Legal empowerment 
must travel bottom-up. Powerful actors, including religious groups, 
must be won over. There are no off-the-shelf blueprints for implemen-
tation. However, for this important paradigm change to occur, political 
leadership is imperative. The government has to be run by presidents 
and prime ministers in cooperation with ministers of finance, justice, 
and labor—not by individual ministers.
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B. Strengthening Regional Ties and Instituting Open Trade Policies
Somalia’s immediate neighbors are Kenya to the southwest, Ethiopia 
to the west, and Djibouti to the northwest. Both Yemen and Saudi Ara-
bia are also accessible by sea. Thus, in essence, Somalia’s closest trad-
ing neighbors are Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. 
However, according to the CIA World Factbook for 2009, Somalia’s top 
three import partners were Djibouti ($233.6 million), India ($95.2 mil-
lion), and Kenya ($60.8 million), while the top three export partners 
were the United Arab Emirates ($168.6 million), Yemen ($63 million), 
and Saudi Arabia ($10.8 million).60 These statistics, however, do not 
capture the large informal trade that takes place between Somalia and 
neighboring countries like Ethiopia and Kenya. It is estimated that 
Somalis consume about $200 million dollars annually in qat imported 
from Kenya and Ethiopia.
As Uganda and Eritrea were so involved in the Somali conflict lately, 
it could be instructive to include them in the list of Somalia’s political 
neighbors. The total population of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, 
and Uganda is over 160 million in an area of 2,750,000 square kilome-
ters.61 The potential gains from trade between Somalia and its neigh-
bors could be huge, yet their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita 
are at the bottom of the world GDP rankings (Djibouti: $2,800; Ethio-
pia $900; Kenya: $1,500; Somalia: $600; and Uganda: $1,200). Trade 
among these countries is hampered by the political instability in Soma-
lia and the hot conflicts between Ethiopia and Eritrea and between Dji-
bouti and Eritrea. Proxy wars among Somalia’s neighbors contribute 
immensely to the continuation of Somalia’s political instability. At the 
moment, the combined GDP of these countries is about $110 billion, 
less than half of the tiny trading nation of the United Arab Emirates 
($230 billion) with a population of 4.2 million and an area of 84,000 
square kilometers. Except for Kenya, the inhabitants of these countries 
live in abject poverty. They are members of the 49 Least Developed 
Countries (LDC) in the world. (See Table 3.) Yemen, Somalia’s neighbor 
on the other side of the Red Sea, is also on that LDC list. But as Table 
3 shows, most of these countries are not landlocked and should have 
benefited from trade with the outside world.
Given the relative availability of natural resources in these countries 
and the strategic geographical location of the region with its access to 
the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean, it is unfathomable 
that the population in this region is as poor, if not poorer, than that in 
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landlocked countries. This region should be the fulcrum of interna-
tional trade. It is now getting a lot of attention from the international 
community, but not for trade. The world is spending billions of dollars 
in fighting terrorism and piracy off the shores of Somalia. France and 
the United States have semi-permanent military bases in the region. 
The United Nations is financing international forces on the border 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is also financing Ugandan and Burun-
dian forces to protect the weak TFG of Somalia from al-Shabaab and its 
supporters. However, fostering trade and security cooperation in the 
region is the only way around the current quagmire. Countries in the 
region should spare no effort in bringing back stability and effective 
governance to Somalia. The question is how? Should they get involved 
militarily in Somalia? Are there any lessons that can be learned from 
the disastrous 2006 Ethiopian military invasion of Somalia? Are the 
Ugandan and Burundian forces currently in Somalia doing any better? 
Is there a way around a military solution to Somalia’s instability? What 
non-military role could the African Union, the Arab League, or coun-
tries in the region play? Finding answers to these questions is the key 
Table 3. List of the Least Developed Countries in the World62
Countries in the three continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean
Africa (33)
 1 Angola  2 Benin  3 Burkina Faso#
 4 Burundi#  5 Central African Republic#  6 Chad#
 7 Comoros*  8 Democratic Republic of the Congo  9 Djibouti ($2,800)
10 Equatorial Guinea 11 Eritrea ($700) 12 Ethiopia ($900)#
13 Gambia 14 Guinea 15 Guinea-Bissau*
16 Lesotho# 17 Liberia 18 Madagascar
19 Malawi# 20 Mali# 21 Mauritania
22 Mozambique 23 Niger# 24 Rwanda ($1,300)#
25 São Tomé and Príncipe* 26 Senegal 27 Sierra Leone
28 Somalia ($600) 29 Sudan 30 Togo
31 Uganda# 32 United Republic of Tanzania 33 Zambia#
Asia (15)
 1 Afghanistan#  2 Bangladesh  3 Bhutan#
 4 Cambodia  5 Kiribati*  6 Lao People’s Democratic Republic#
 7 Maldives*  8 Myanmar  9 Nepal#
10 Samoa* 11 Solomon Islands* 12 Timor-Leste*
13 Tuvalu* 14 Vanuatu* 15 Yemen
Latin America and the Caribbean (1)
 1 Haiti *
* Also Small Island Developing States
#Also Land-Locked Developing Countries
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to generating stability in the region. The next question would be how 
to set up flexible and open trade policies for these countries.
C.  Summary Recommendations
1.  Although past foreign aid did not achieve many of its stated objec-
tives, for Somalia to become a functioning country again any recon-
structive government will require a massive amount of financial 
and strategic support from the international community in order to 
rebuild national institutions.
2.  The focus of foreign aid should be on legal empowerment of the 
poor and on incorporating the extralegal assets, businesses, and 
labour of the poor into the country’s formal economy.
3.  A system of flexible decentralized governance is necessary to facili-
tate a bottom-up legal empowerment of the poor.
4.  In order to create the proper conditions for governmentality and 
good governance, the reconstructive government should attempt 
to finance the majority of its operations with tax levies on residents 
rather than foreign aid or debt.
5.  In order to improve the government’s tax base, initial international 
aid must include funds for setting up viable taxation systems and 
projects that create employment and business activities.
6.  To encourage trade, a Somali reconstructive government must 
enter into trade agreements with its neighbours and other trading 
partners to reduce tariffs and other border taxes.
7.  Somalia’s foreign policy toward its neighbours must balance sover-
eignty with the flexibility necessary to optimize gainful trade.
*The author acknowledges research assistance by Christiene Merkel 
and monetary support from CGA Alberta.
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